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June 2007

June 27, 2007

June 8, 2007 COA "Tort Report" for Civil, Tort & Ins. Decisions

PUBLISHED COA DECISIONS ON TORTS FROM JUNE 8, 2007

  • None

NONPUBLISHED COA DECISIONS ON TORTS FROM JUNE 8, 2007

  • SKAGGS V. TRI-COUNTY ANIMAL SHELTER
    CIVIL:  Civil Contempt

    2004-CA-000841
    NOT PUBLISHED: 90
    DATE RENDERED: 6/8/2007
     
  • RILES V. THE KENTUCKY LOTTERY CORP.
    CIVIL PROCEDURE:  RULE 60.01 - correction of clerical mistakes vs. judicial mistakes

    2004-CA-001234
    NOT PUBLISHED: 99
    DATE RENDERED: 6/8/2007

  • LAWSON V. HUNT
    CIVIL PROCEDURE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT (findings of fact; conclusions of law; affidavits, failure to present contradictory evidence not fatal)
    TORTS:  CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIM, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
    2005-CA-002214
    NOT PUBLISHED: 110
    DATE RENDERED: 6/8/2007

  • PRATHER V. PROVIDIAN NATIONAL BANK
    EVIDENCE: AUTHENTICATING DOCUMENTS
    BUSINESS: CONTRACT BREACH AND IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH
    2006-CA-000630

    NOT PUBLISHED: 100
    DATE RENDERED: 6/8/2007

  • THE KENTUCKY LOTTERY CORP. V. RILES
    EVIDENCE:  KRE 403
    EMPLOYMENT:  Constructive Discharge
    TORTS:  Discrimination
    2004-CA-001053
    NOT PUBLISHED: 141
    DATE RENDERED: 6/8/2007

  • SENIOR HEALTHCARE INS. & FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. V. CLEMENTI
    TORTS: STATUTORY SECURITIES FRAUD AND VICARIOUS LIABILITY
    2006-CA-001348
    NOT PUBLISHED: 111
    DATE RENDERED: 6/8/2007

June 25, 2007

June 1, 2007 COA "Tort Report" for Civil, Tort & Ins. Decisions

PUBLISHED COA DECISIONS ON TORTS FROM JUNE 1, 2007

  • JACKSON V. TULLAR
    DAMAGES:  Dram Shop and Punitives
    TORTS:  DRAM SHOP; APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT; PUNITIVE DAMAGES

    2005-CA-001006
    PUBLISHED; AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING IN PART
    JUDGES: DIXON PRESIDING W/ABRAMSON AND HENRY CONCURRING
    PRIOR OPINION DATED 3/2/07 WITHDRAWN
    LOWER COURT: McCRACKEN CIR. CT.
    DATE RENDERED: 6/1/2007

    The CA affirms as to the amount of compensatory damages and reverses as to the punitive damage award. The case is remanded for a new trial on the issue of apportionment of liability between the parties.

    Jackson was an injured passenger in an alcohol-related single vehicle MVA where Duncan was the driver. The parties went to several bars that night; their last party stop was the Ginger & Pickles nightclub where they were served a “pickle bowl,” a concoction of pure grain alcohol and Kool-Aid. Jackson ultimately sued bar owners, shareholders, and her carrier. The case went to trial against the driver, the last bar to serve him, and the bar’s owner. The jury was instruction on a 4-way apportionment of fault between the plaintiff, the driver, the second-to-the-last bar to serve them and the last bar to serve them. The jury assessed fault as follows: 10% to plaintiff; 20 % to driver; and 35% to bar. The jury awarded compensatory damages of $1,600,000. The jury then found the driver, the last bar and the last bar’s owner to be grossly negligent, but only assessed punitives against the last bar ($350,000) and its owner ($150,000). On appeal, all parties challenge the apportionment of fault.

    In DeStock #14, Inc. v. Logsdon, 993 S.W.2d 952 (Ky. 1999), the Kentucky Supreme Court examined the language of KRS 413.241, commonly referred to as the Dram Shop Act, and concluded that liability may be imposed upon a dram shop despite the statute’s express declaration that a dram shop’s actions cannot, as a matter of law, be considered the proximate cause of any injury inflicted by an intoxicated person. This means the tortfeasor remains primarily liable while the dram shop is secondarily liable. Also, the dram shop and the tortfeasor are not concurrently negligent, but instead have committed two separate and independently tortuous acts. Because of these distinctions, the apportionment is improper. The instruction should have required the jury to apportion fault between just the driver and the passenger. Then, only after the jury found the driver to have some percentage of fault, should the jury have determined whether the elements of the Dram Shop Act were satisfied such that either or both dram shops could be held secondarily liable. Because it is now impossible to know how the jury might have apportioned under this instruction, the case must be reversed and remanded for a new trial.

    Both parties also appeal the award of punitive damages. CA concludes that punitives cannot be recovered in a dram shop action.

    Digested by John Hamlet

  • ASHLAND HOSP. CORP. V. SLUSHER
    TORTS:  Defamation; Qualified privilege of employer and "common interest"

    2006-CA-000395
    PUBLISHED; AFFIRMING; REVERSING AND REMANDING
    JUDGES: KNOPF PRESIDING W/KELLER AND TAYOR CONCURRING
    LOWER COURT: BOYD CIR CT
    DATE RENDERED: 6/1/2007

    The dispositive issues in this appeal are whether appellants, King's Daughters Medical Center and its chief financial officer, Paul McDowell, were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Dr. Mary Beth Calor's claims of defamation and tortious interference with contractual relations which she based upon communications appellants made to Staff Care, Inc. concerning her billing practices. A jury trial resulted in an award to Dr. Calor in the amount of $175,000.00 for emotional and mental distress, $59,050.00 in lost wages, and $300,000.00 in punitive damages.

    Because there is no dispute as to the nature of the appellants' statements or the context in which they were communicated to Staff Care, appellants were entitled to application of a qualified privilege as a matter of law on the defamation claim and a verdict in their favor on the tortious interference claim. The judgment must therefore be reversed.

    In December 2001, the quality assurance department at Staff Care became concerned about the number of hours Dr. Calor was claiming. Michelle VonLuckner,who was Staff Care's scheduling consultant for Dr. Calor, initially contacted Dr. Calor's husband, who was also her business manager, concerning the accuracy of the hours claimed. He assured Ms. VonLuckner that the hours claimed were accurate.

    Nevertheless, Staff Care's concerns over the number of hours Dr. Calor was claiming continued, based primarily on the fact that they were paying “outrageous malpractice premiums” due to the extraordinary amount of actual patient contact she was claiming on the form with Staff Care "red-flagging" many of her bills as involving a questionable number of hours.

    Dr. Calor was terminated by the hospital after she refused to meet with their CFO without her business manager-husband being present. The Hospital CFO (McDowell) then contacted notified Staff Care Dr. Calor had been  based upon suspicion that she had been over-billing and that the hospital was investigating her billing records.

    As to the defamation claim, the COA was convinced that upon the undisputed facts of this case appellants were protected by a qualified privilege in reporting the results of their investigation into Dr. Calor's billable hours to Staff Care.   Under the “common interest” theory, as explained by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Stringer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 151 S.W.3d 781, 796 (Ky. 2004), appellants clearly had the right, if not the duty, to investigate and convey their concerns about Dr. Calor 's billing to Staff Care which had a corresponding interest in the accuracy of her hours.   The Court in Stringer also provides guidance as to the conditional nature of qualified privileges and the circumstances under which the right to claim the privilege may be lost.   The condition attached to all such qualified privileges is that they must be exercised in a reasonable manner and for a proper purpose. The immunity is forfeited if the defendant steps outside the scope of the privilege, or abuses the occasion. The qualified privilege does not extend to the publication of irrelevant defamatory matter with no bearing upon the public or private interest which is entitled to protection.   

    COA found there is no question that King's Daughters' communications to Staff Care concerning its investigation into Dr. Calor's hours fall squarely within the Stringer rationale.

    Based upon these factors, appellants were entitled to judgment on Dr. Calor's defamation claims as a matter of law. We are thus convinced that the trial court erred in allowing either the defamation claim or the tortious interference claim to be resolved by a jury.  Accordingly, the judgment in her favor is reversed and the case remanded for entry of an order dismissing those claims.

    by Michael Stevens

NONPUBLISHED COA DECISIONS ON TORTS FROM JUNE 1, 2007

  • INTEGRATED TELECOM SERVICES CORP. V. LINN STATION PROPERTIES LLC
    APPEALS: DATE TRIGGERING IS CLERK'S NOTATION AND NOT SERVICE DATE
    ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION

    2005-CA-002151
    NOT PUBLISHED; AFFIRMING
    DATE RENDERED: 6/1/2007
  • HOLLIS V. HOLLIS
    CIVIL PROCEDURE:  NO RIGHT TO VIDEOTAPING PROCEEDINGS WHEN NOT AVAILABLE
    APPEALS:  FRIVOLOUS APPEALS
    2005-CA-000770
    NOT PUBLISHED; AFFIRMING
    DATE RENDERED: 6/1/2007

  • HAVEN STEEL PRODUCTS INC. V. COWAN
    CIVIL PROCEDURE: ABUSE OF DISCRETION DENYING TP CLAIM UNDER CR 14
    EVIDENCE:  PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND OTHER "SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR" INCIDENTS
    2005-CA-002295
    NOT PUBLISHED; REVERSING AND REMANDING
    LAMBERT (PJ); STUMBO (CONCURRING); BUCKINGHAM DISSENTS W/SEP. OPINION
    DATE RENDERED: 6/1/2007

  • GERSTLE V. CLAY
    CIVIL PROCEDURE: AMENDING COMPLAINT; PROPERTY PARTY (INDIVIDUAL LAWYER OR PSC)
    2006-CA-000121
    NOT PUBLISHED; REVERSING AND REMANDING
    DATE RENDERED: 6/1/2007

  • MITCHELL V. STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INS. CO.
    INSURANCE:  MVRA IS EXCLUSIVE REMEDY FOR NONPAYMENT OF NO FAULT BENEFITS; NO CLAIM UNDER UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT
    2004-CA-002239
    NOT PUBLISHED; AFFIRMING; DIXON (PJ) WITH HENRY AND THOMPSON (SEP OP) CONCURRING
    DATE RENDERED: 6/1/2007

  • MALONE V. KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. CO.
    INSURANCE:  COOTS NOTICE AND REQUIREMENT OF "INTENT TO SETTLE"

    2006-CA-001276
    NOT PUBLISHED; AFFIRMING;
    STUMBO (PRESIDING); BUCKINGHAM AND HENRY CONCUR
    FROM MCCRACKERN CIR. CT
    DATE RENDERED: 6/1/2007

June 21, 2007

May 25, 2007 COA "Tort Report" for Civil, Tort & Ins. Decisions

PUBLISHED COA TORT DECISIONS FROM MAY 25, 2007

BUGG V. AMERICAN LEGION, ANDERSON POST. NO. 34
TORTS:  PREMISES LIABILITY - Business invitee - landlord liability

2006-CA-000429
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING
JUDGES:  NICKELL PRESIDING; MOORE AND LAMBERT CONCURS
DATE RENDERED: 5/25/2007
COUNTY:  ANDERSON

CA affirms grant of directed verdict for appellee in this unusual premise liability case.Appellant was injured when a fellow patron of a horse show - under the influence of marijuana, cocaine and alcohol - was arrested and his concealed weapon accidentally discharged, hitting appellant. 

CA holds that appellant failed to show that appellee or its agents failed to act or provide sufficient security, once it became aware of the other patron's inebriated and belligerent state.

Digested by John Hamlet

NONPUBLISHED COA TORT DECISIONS FROM MAY 25, 2007

GREAT SENECA FINANCIAL CORP. V. JOHNSON
CIVIL / CRIMINAL:  CONTEMPT RE ATTORNEY'S FAILURE TO APPEAR AT HEARING HE/SHE NOTICED

2006-CA-000751

Failure of an attorney to appear for trial or at motion hour is traditionally treated as criminal contempt requiring proof of criminal intent.  In contrast, an indirect criminal contempt occurs "outside the presence of the court" and requires an evidentiary hearing comporting with due process to determine whether a court order has been violated.

The failure of GSF's attorney to appear at the default hearing on February 9, 2006, was an indirect criminal contempt. As such, an evidentiary hearing was required to determine whether GSF's counsel's absence was willful disobedience, open disrespect for the trial court, or perhaps excusable neglect. No such hearing occurred before the $500.00 sanction was imposed by the trial court. VACATED AND REMANDED.

FLOWITT V. ASHLAND HOSPITAL CORPORATION
TORTS and BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM BY PHYSICIAN WHO BECAME DISABLED

2006-CA-000785
NOT PUBLISHED:  AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, REMANDING
DATE RENDERED: 5/25/2007

June 19, 2007

May 24, 2007 SCOKY "Tort Report" for Civil, Tort & Ins. Decisions

There were no tort, insurance or procedure decisions from SCOKY for May 24, 2007.

May 18, 2007 COA "Tort Report" for Civil, Tort & Ins. Decisions

PUBLISHED COA DECISIONS FROM MAY 18, 2007

  • HACK V. BAKER
    TORTS:  Premises Liability

    2006-CA-001100
    PUBLISHED: PANEL: DIXON (PRESIDING JUDGE) WITH THOMPSON AND HENRY (SJ) CONCURRING
    REVERSING AND REMANDING (JEFFERSON CIR. CT., MORRIS, J.)
    DATE RENDERED: 5/18/2007

    CA reverses and remands TC entry of SJ for defendants in this trip-and-fall case. (Jeff. Cir. Ct., Hon. Geoffrey P. Morris, judge, presiding).

    Appellees Baker moved into a new home in June across the street from Appellant Hack. Appellees Insight and G&C installed video cable at the Baker's home, failing to bury the coaxial cable and leaving it laying on the ground at the Baker residence. The Bakers placed three separate calls to Insight to remedy the hazard, but Insight failed to do so.

    The neighbors were cordial and the Hacks visited with the Bakers in their home several times by invitation. Appellant Hack also testified that the custom in the neighborhood was for families to frequently traversed other families' yards while playing and socializing. (The parties live on a cul-de-sac with no sidewalks). Appellant Hack tripped on the cable, shattering his right arm, while playing in a yard adjacent to the Bakers and running through the Bakers' nearby yard; the Bakers were not present.

    Hack sued the Bakers and Insight; the Bakers and Insight claimed he was a trespasser to whom they owed no duty; Hack argued he was an "implied invitee" (licensee), and Appellees owed him a duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances, which they failed to do.  The TC agreed that Hack was a trespasser and granted SJ to the Bakers, also holding that Insight stood in the shoes of the Bakers on liability.

    COA holds that the facts as Hack has alleged them create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Hack was a trespasser or licensee. "THe custom of the neighborhood of brief entry onto each other's yards coupled with the Bakers' failure to voice objection creates a genuine issue of their acquiescence to such conduct. This Court cannot say that Hack was a trespasser as a matter of law." The CA also holds that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the cable's location constituted an unsafe condition on the premises which created an unreasonable risk of danger to those living in the neighborhood.

    By
    John Hamlet 

NONPUBLISHED COA TORT DECISIONS FROM MAY 18, 2007

BANKS V. TAGGART
CIVIL:  Bench trial standards for judge
2005-CA-002134
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED: 89 kb
DATE RENDERED: 5/18/2007

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. V. CLARK
CIVIL PROCEDURE:  Involuntary dismissal standards
2005-CA-002144
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED: 94 kb
DATE RENDERED: 5/18/2007

CADLE CO.  V. MMAPCO, LLC
CIVIL PROCEDURE:  Involuntary dismissal; attorney not receiving mail or following court orders
2005-CA-002611
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING (LAMBERT PJ W/ACREE DISSENTING BY SEP OP.)
DATE RENDERED: 5/18/2007

OVERSTREET V. LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOV'T
CIVIL PROCEDURE:  Summary judgment
2006-CA-000280
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING (DIXON)
DATE RENDERED: 5/18/2007

JIM HUFF REALTY, INC. V. TOMLIN PROPERTIES, LTC
DAMAGES:  Unjust enrichment
2005-CA-002245
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED: 121 kb
DATE RENDERED: 5/18/2007

June 11, 2007

May 11, 2007 COA "Tort Report" for Civil, Tort & Ins. Decisions

Published Decisions:

  • RICHARDSON V. HEAD
    CIVIL PROCEDURE:  CR 60.02 RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT 

    2006-CA-001217
    PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING;  WINE PRESIDING JUDGE WITH BUCKINGHAM & HENRY CONCURRING
    DATE RENDERED: 5/11/2007

This is an appeal of a will and codocil contest as to the testator's signature.  The jury determined the decedent did not sign either document.  One of the witnesses (an occupational therapist) testifed at the trial as to the inability of the decedent testator who was suffering from multi-system atrophy similar to Parkinson's disease to orally communicate and write.  No motion was filed for a new trial, but a motion under CR 60.02(b) to set aside the judgment was filed claiming perjury by the occupational therapist and offering undated videos and photos of the decedent acting with control and communication skills; and affidavits were offered to date the evidence.

To prevail under CR 60.02, a party must offer newly discovered evidence and demonstrate some significant defect in the trial proceeding or evidence at trial such that a substantial miscarriage of justice will result from the effect of the final judgment.

COA concluded trial court did not abuse discretion.  The video tapes and photos were in the possession of one of the parties and medical records available regarding decedent's condition.  The trial court could reasonably find no due diligence in discovery of the evidence or that it was principally of an impeaching character which does not constitute grounds under CR 60.02; or that the evidence was not of a compelling nature to lead to a different result.  Affirmed.

Digested by Michael Stevens

  • MILLER V. CUNDIFF
    TORTS: PREMISED LIABILITY - DUTY TO REPAIR;  LANDLORD LIABILITY TO TENANT FOR OPEN AND OBVIOUS DEFECTS IN CARPET

    2005-CA-002536
    PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING W/WINE PJ AND HENRY AND BUCKINGHAM CONCURRING
    DATE RENDERED: 5/11/2007

Appellant-tenant appeals from a grant of SJ against her in a suit claiming personal injuries due to landlord's failure to repair premises. CA affirms.

Tenant claims landlord promised to repair a gap in the carpet between two rooms in an apartment repeatedly, both before and after the lease was signed. The lease was silent on the repair, however. A two months after moving in, tenant tripped on the carpet and fell, breaking her wrist. She sued for personal injuries, arguing that the Uniform Residential Landlord-Tenant Act (URLTA) abrogated the common law rule that the landlord has no duty to repair leased premises in the absence of an agreement to do so. Landlord argues that the tenant takes the premises as she finds them and he has no liability for open and obvious conditions.

CA holds that, even if the landlord promised to repair the carpet, he is not liable for injuries for a breach, only the cost of the repair. CA holds that URLTA does not abrogate the common law rule in Kentucky because the legislature's intent to do so must be clearly apparent. KRS 383.510 indicates that URLTA was intended to supplement, not replace, the common law. Also, Kentucky authorizes individual counties to adopt URLTA, but does not mandate it statewide.

Digested by John Hamlet

See, analysis at Kentucky Tort and Ins. Law Blog - Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act (URLTA) Does Not Alter Common Law Landlord Liability.

NON-PUBLISHED DECISIONS

  • HEADLEY BLUFF LAND CO. V. CITY OF CADIZ, KY
    APPEALS:  DISMISSED AS INTERLOCUTORY RE ORDINANCE

    2005-CA-001197
    NOT PUBLISHED:
    DATE RENDERED: 5/11/2007
  • PEARSON V. NORTON HOSPITAL, INC.
    CIVIL PROCEDURE:  REVERSED DISMISSAL FOR DISCOVERY ISSUE (EXPERT DISCLOSURES)
    2006-CA-000585
    NOT PUBLISHED:
    DATE RENDERED: 5/11/2007
  • CALIHAN V. POWER MARKETING DIRECT, INC.
    CIVIL PROCEDURE:  CHOICE OF FORUM CLAUSES
    2005-CA-002600

    NOT PUBLISHED:
    DATE RENDERED: 5/02/2007; MODIFIED 5/11/2007
  • ROGERS V. DAVENPORT
    TORTS:  BREACH OF MARITAL CONTRACT (NOT FOUND IN KY, BUT MAY IF INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS); VALUE OF SERVICES PER QUANTUM MERUIT
    2005-CA-002594
    NOT PUBLISHED:
    DATE RENDERED: 5/11/2007

June 10, 2007

News Flash: Study shows insureds don't understand their homeowner's insurance policies! Duh! Many lawyers, judges, and court decisions confirm that point every day.

Here is a post from Insurance Coverage Law Blog that tells us something we don't already know, but noone is going to do anything about it - folks don't read or understand their insurance policies!  However, the law does not stop assuming they read them, understand them, and are bound by them since all are presumed to know the law in spite of the fact that it takes four years of college, three years of law school, and a bar examination before we can practice law!

If you have any doubts, then take a look at Nationwide v. Abney  2004-SC-000937-DG.pdf when the claimant should have known the release he signed released the whole wide world of tortfeasors and not just the one for whom Nationwide was writing the check for the simple reason that is what he signed - "all other persons". 

It makes no difference that many plaintiffs' lawyer's jaws may have collectively dropped on reading this, and every insurance adjuster in the state "licked their lips" and started scrutinizing and asking for those liability releases to try and extend it to joint tortfeasors, indemnitees, and UIM/UM carriers.

And it makes no never-mind, that the Abney decision was a TORT decision which focused on KRS 411.182 and the abolition of joint and several liability applicability to release of tortfeasors which questions its applicability to the CONTRACTUAL claim represented by underinsured motorist benefits.

See, eg.:

Kentucky Farm Bureau  Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 177 S.W.3d 797, 801 (Ky. 2005).
[W]e are of the opinion that the legislature was quite clear in its intent to exclude contract actions, including those for UM and UIM coverage, from the scope of KRS 411.182. And while we certainly agree that UM and UIM actions involve aspects of tort law, in that the allocation of fault is a necessary prerequisite to coverage, our case law firmly establishes that the contractual nature of the claims is procedurally controlling.

And;

True v. Raines, 99 S.W.3d 439 (Ky.,2003)
Nor do we write without recognizing that the claimant may execute a release recognizing he intends to release not only the tortfeasor, but his own UIM carrier, specifying he has been “fully compensated for all damages and the release constitutes payment in satisfaction of all claims.” Richardson v. Eastland, Inc., Ky., 660 S.W.2d 7, 9 (1983).

Here is the post:

Survey finds homeowners have badly mistaken beliefs about coverage

This doesn't surprise me much [eg., insurance coverage blogger who wrote the post]. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners did a survey of homeowner beliefs about what their policies cover, and found huge percentages have mistaken ideas. Here's one example from the NAIC report:

The survey found that 33 percent of U.S. heads of household, who own a home and have homeowners insurance, incorrectly believe flood damages would be covered by a standard homeowners or property and liability policy, despite extensive media coverage on Hurricane Katrina victims whose claims were denied because they lacked flood insurance.

Here are some other findings:

  • 68 percent think vehicles such as cars, boats and motorcycles stolen from or damaged on their property are covered.
  • 51 percent think damages from a break in the water line on their property supplying water to their home are covered.
  • 37 percent think damages due to a break in the sewer line on their property that connects to their municipal sewer system are covered.
  • 35 percent think damages from earthquakes are covered.
  • 34 percent think damages from mold are covered.
  • 31 percent think damages from termites or other infestation are covered.
  • 22 percent think pets stolen from or injured on their property are covered.
  • Actually, I'm [insurance coverage blogger] surprised these percentages aren't higher.

    Click here, read the rest of his post, and be amazed how the reality of the insureds falls short of the expectations of our judicial decisions and presumptions.

    June 08, 2007

    U.S. Sixth Cir. Ct. of Appeals denies state court jurisdiction over structured FTCA settlement per sovereign immunity

    Sixth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals  has held the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity deprives a state court of jurisdiction to approve a transfer of structured-settlement payment rights where the U.S. nominally owns, but has no beneficial interest in, the annuity funding the payments.

    TransAmerica v. USA, et al.
    Western District of Kentucky at Louisville

    COOK, Circuit Judge. Settlement Capital Corporation (“Settlement Capital”) appeals a district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the United States on the basis of federal sovereign immunity. We affirm.

    This case turns on whether the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity deprives a state court of jurisdiction to approve a transfer of structured-settlement payment rights where the United States nominally owns—but has no beneficial interest in—the annuity funding these payments. If federal sovereign immunity applies, summary judgment should be granted in favor of the government. Cf. Akers v. Alvey, 338 F.3d 491, 497 (6th Cir. 2003). 

    June 03, 2007

    May 4, 2007 COA "Tort Report" of Decisions on Civil, Torts, and Insurance

    Published Decisions:

    • GOLDSMITH V. BENNETT-GOLDSMITH
      FAMILY LAW:  Faxing documents to court; Support (no material change found)
      CIVIL PROCEDURE: Fax used to file discovery with court

      2006-CA-001680
      PUBLISHED:  AFFIRMING (THOMPSON)
      DATE RENDERED: 5/4/2007

      CA affirms denial of motions to strike evidence and to reduce child support. (Jeff. Cir. Ct., Hon. Kevin L. Garvey, Judge, presiding).

      Appellant and appellee are divorced with one child born of their former marriage. Appellant, ordered to pay $676/month in child support in 2002, had accumulated $2,472 in arrears over the years while paying over $4,000 toward consumer debt. Appellant was held in contempt and ordered jailed one day for every day he remained in arrears. His parents paid his arrearage. As time passed, however, similar proceedings continued. in 2006, Appellant filed a motion to reduce his child support obligation. Appellee filed a response and a discovery order was entered, noting that either party's failure to comply would result in severe sanctions. Appellee mailed her discovery responses to Appellant at 9:55 a.m. on the last day to comply and had faxed the responses to the court at 1:32 a.m. Appellant also sent his responses before the expiration of the deadline and both parties received the other's information before the hearing. However, on the day of the hearing, Appellant filed a motion to strike appellee's evidence (including her responses) for failure to comply with the court's order and CRs 12.06 and 5.03. After hearing, the judge denied the motions to strike and to reduce child support.

      Appellant appeals, arguing that appellee's use of the fax is not an acceptable method for filing, and her documents should have been stricken, and she should have been precluded from presenting any evidence. CA agrees that appellee complied with the discovery order.

      As to the merits of Appellant's motion for child support reduction, he claims he no longer owns rental properties that once netted him income; and that the court failed to consider his mental illness (bipolar). The TC found no material change to warrant a reduction under the statute; CA agrees that Appellant did not meet his burden of showing material change in that he provided no explanation as to how the rental properties he claims he no longer owns were disposed of.

      Digested by John Hamlet 

    Non-published decisions:

    • CIVIL PROCEDURE:  JURISDICTION - actual case or controversy required and advisory opinions; mootness; justiciable
      2005-CA-002453
      NOT PUBLISHED: 119 kb
      DATE RENDERED: 5/4/2007

      Unless there is an actual case involving a present, ongoing controversy, the issues surrounding it become moot. Our courts are not at liberty to give advisory opinions -- even on important public issues. Philpot v. Patton 837 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. 1992). Indeed, our courts lack jurisdiction to decide issues that do not arise from a live controversy. See Commonwealth v. Hughes, 873 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1994).

      This case falls squarely within the mootness doctrine. If we were to reverse the court’s order with respect to LFUCG’s decision not to release the copy of the 911 call recording, the reversal would have no effect as the recording has been destroyed and is no longer subject to public disclosure. Although the matter arguably involves an issue of public importance, it is not subject to “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine.

      As we have concluded that the issue in this case is nonjusticiable and not subject to the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine, we dismiss this appeal.

    • CRESTWOOD AUTO SALES V. COMPTON
      INSURANCE:  Dealer's ownership at time of accident reviewed and propriety of transferring title

      2006-CA-000496
      NOT PUBLISHED: 101 kb
      DATE RENDERED: 5/4/2007
       
    • TORTS:  "Discovery" rule for bringing suit
      2006-CA-001248
      NOT PUBLISHED: 96 kb
      DATE RENDERED: 5/4/2007

      Under this rule of law, Keith had one year from the time his injury (health/breathing problems) was or should have been discovered to bring suit against Epperson. While it may be true that Keith did file suit within one year of realizing that his health problems and the breathing of the fumes and soot allegedly caused by Epperson’s negligence may be related, that does not save the timeliness of the filing of his civil complaint.  Keith had one year from the onset of his health problems to file the complaint. 

    Contemporaneous Objections Do Not Mean Immediately!

    In the heat of a trial, you must preserve error by objecting, and objecting contemporaneously during opening and closing.  Well, have fast is contemporaneous?

    In Polk v. Greer, the COA in a Published decision on 4/28/2007, 2006-CA-000340, indicated the following:

    COA held that an objection voiced less than one minute after the claimed error and before any other material phase of the trial had begun meets the “contemporaneous objection” requirement of CR 46. Indeed, the purpose of the contemporaneous-objection rule is to afford the trial court an opportunity to prevent or cure any error in a timely fashion.  See Olden v. Commonwealth, 203 S.W.3d 672, 675 (Ky. 2006) (purpose of criminal analog of  contemporaneous-objection rule).

    And here, because Polk voiced his objection a mere 45 seconds after the error occurred and before the trial had actually moved on past its opening-statement phase, Polk's delay in no way impinged upon the trial court's opportunity to attempt curative measures. Consequently, we reject Greer's contention that Polk's mistrial claim is not preserved for  review.