ANGEL V. METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INS. CO.
INSURANCE: UNDERINSURED MOTORIST BENEFITS NOT INCLUDE PTSD PER POLICY DEFINITIONS
2007-CA-001521
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED: 91
DATE RENDERED: 6/20/2008
We conclude that the UIM provision at issue in this case clearly excludes coverage of PTSD in the absence of physical manifestations.
With respect to the UIM coverage, the Angel’s policy with Metropolitan stated in relevant part:
We will pay damages for bodily injury sustained by: 1. you or a relative, caused by an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of an underinsured highway vehicle, which you or a relative are legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an underinsured highway vehicle;
The policy defines bodily injury as:
“bodily injury” means any bodily injury, sickness, or disease sustained by any person. The term includes death of any person if it is a result of covered bodily injury, sickness, or disease.
Although there are no Kentucky cases on point, the trial court relied on a Washington Supreme Court case, Daley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 958 P.2d 990 (Wash. 1998), in concluding PTSD was not covered under the Angel’s UIM policy. In Daley, the Washington Supreme Court interpreted a UIM provision similar to the one in this case and held that “ the term ‘bodily injury’ does not encompass recovery for purely emotional injuries.” Id. at 994. The plaintiff in Daley, a sheriff's deputy, was assisting a stranded motorcyclist when a car struck him and another officer at the scene. Id. The other officer later died from his injuries, but Daley suffered only bruises, swelling, and lacerations on his arm and leg. Id. Over a year after the accident, Daley was diagnosed with depression and late-onset PTSD. Id. Daley's emotional distress was attributable in part to “the guilt and emotional trauma related to witnessing [the other officer’s] fatal injuries in addition to the emotional trauma of the accident itself.” Id. at 993. The court concluded that Daley’s “purely emotional distress,” which was unaccompanied by physical symptoms, did not qualify as a “bodily injury” under his UIM policy. Id. at 995.
Later, in Trinh v. Allstate Ins. Co., 37 P.3d 1259 (Wash.App. 2002), the Washington Court of Appeals held that bodily injury does include emotional injuries that are accompanied by physical manifestations. In Trinh, the insured witnessed the death of her best friend when he was hit by a drunk driver while helping the insured change her flat tire. Id. Trinh was diagnosed with PTSD and sought coverage under the UIM provisions of her automobile insurance policy. Id. The insurer claimed PTSD was not a bodily injury under the insured's coverage. Id. However, unlike the plaintiff in Daley, Trinh alleged her PTSD was accompanied by physical injuries, which included weight loss, hair loss, fragile fingernails, loss of sleep, headaches, stomach pains, and muscle aches. The court held that when there are physical manifestations of PTSD, it qualifies as bodily injury under such a UIM policy. Id. at 937.
We conclude that the UIM provision at issue in this case clearly excludes coverage of PTSD in the absence of physical manifestations. Unlike the insured in Trihn, Linda alleged no physical injuries that accompanied Mikel’s PTSD. The language of the UIM policy is clear. We find no reasonable reading of the provision that would cover purely emotional injuries. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in construing the policy as not covering PTSD.
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