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Recent Posts

Evidence

March 09, 2008

Spoliation of Evidence, duties of a minor: Hays v. Alia (COA 10/19/2007)

HAYS V. ALIA
TORTS:  INSTRUCTIONS; DUTY OF MINOR; SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE

2006-CA-001871
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING
PANEL:  STUMBO PRESIDING; NICKELL, HENRY CONCUR
COUNTY: JEFFERSON
DATE RENDERED: 10/19/2007

CA affirms jury verdict for defense in this trampoline injury case.

Seven-year-old Katie visited her grandparents in Louisville. She left their home to walk down the street to meet a neighbor. En route and unsupervised by anyone, Katie met an unknown neighbor girl and began jumping with her on her family's trampoline. Katie suffered a significant leg break requiring surgeries and resulting in differing leg lengths.

CA upholds denial of directed verdict for plaintiff on liability because there was sufficient evidence on the issue, including Katie's grandparents' supervision, to present a question for the jury. Denial of directed verdict for plaintiff on her contributory fault is moot because the jury found in her favor on this question. Finally, the denial of a jury instruction on spoliation of evidence (destruction of the trampoline) was not improper as the destruction was considered a subsequent remedial measure.

Digested by John Hamlet
Sitlinger, McGlincy, Theiler & Karem

December 17, 2007

RULES: Kentucky Rules of Evidence Changes Effective May 1, 2007 - Part 2: KRE 404 Character evidence and evidence of other crimes

Kentucky Rules of Evidence Changes Effective May 1, 2007 - Part 2: KRE 404 Character evidence and evidence of other crimes

Kentucky Rules of Evidence Changes Effective May 1, 2007 - Part 1: KRE 103

April 28, 2007

Is a chiropractor qualified to apply the AMA Guidelines? No said the 6th Circuit some years ago.

While reviewing some old postings elsewhere on the net at Daubert on the Web , I found an interesting not-for-publication decision from the Sixth Circuit back in 2001 holding it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude chiropractor's testimony on the applicability of the American Medical Association Guidelines for Evaluating Permanent Impairment.

Taulbee v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 99-6690 (6th Cir. Feb. 21, 2001) (unpublished).  Jury finds for defendant in slip-and-fall after plaintiff's chiropractor is barred from testifying using AMA guidelines to describe plaintiff's impairment.  Exclusion affirmed.  District court did not abuse discretion in holding that testimony invoking AMA guidelines should come from licensed physicians, not chiropractors.

Of course, the application of this case would provide an interesting contrast to the recent SCOKY ruling that an injured plaintiff can fill the blanks in lost earnings once a expert (doctor) opines he or she has a permanent injury.  See, SCOKY holds permanent injury warrants permanent impairment of earning power instruction and guidelines for required proof .  Although SCOKY favored expert testimony on earnings, that does not mean that Daubert and the qualifications of the experts are to be thrown asunder.

Lawreader Poses Peer Review Questions on AMA Guidelines and their applicability in Workers Compensation

I was reading a post at LawReader which questioned whether the application of the AMA Guidelines for the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment would survive Daubert scrutiny in workers compensation proceedings.

My initial reaction is that if Daubert is an evidentiary standard on the applicability of expert testimony then it should have no relevance to the applicability to the substantive standard for awarding and measuring damages in a legislatively-created system of compensation since the guidelines are part and parcel of the objective measures for awarding disability benefits.   

With that thought in mind, I went to the premier blog site of Daubert on the Web and searched for the AMA Guidelines to see what popped up in the area of workers compensation.  Nothing did.  One post regarding Tennessee noted an improper application of the ratings in a workers compensation proceeding with some Daubert applications - Harmless Error to Admit Whole-Body Impairment Testimony for Psychological Injury, Tennessee High Court Holds - but nothing regarding peer review deficiencies behind those ratings.

In any event, here is the link to the LawReader story, analysis and citations on Daubert and Workers Compensation:

The Ky. legislature has mandated that the American Medical Association “Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment” be used to determine the impairment rating caused by injury or occupational disease.  See KRS 342.730.   Other states have ditched the AMA Guidelines and adopted their own guidelines.  * * * [click on heading for entire post]

March 24, 2007

SCOKY holds permanent injury warrants permanent impairment of earning power instruction and guidelines for required proof

SCOCKY has ruled in Reece v. Nationwide Ins. Co. that "the plaintiff need only prove with reasonable probability that the injury is permanent in order to obtain an instruction on permanent impairment of earning power".   

This decision is significant  for several reasons. First, SCOKY was unanimous with all concurring in Justice Schroder's majority opinion.  Second, the rule is now clear when the plaintiff is entitled to instructions on what are typically referred to as "future wages" or "impaired capacity to labor and earn money."

A permanent injury entitles plaintiff to an instruction on capacity to earn money in the future. . . . period.  No requirement for a vocational expert of other expert to connect any permanent restrictions to employment; no requirement for an AMA impairment rating.  The jury is trusted to handle the decision based upon the doctor stating a permanent injury, and the plaintiff can simply testify how he or she is affected.

Of course, what is required to present the matter to the jury is not necessarily what will be sufficient to persuade the jury on the value of those damages for an award.  The family doctor testifying the neck strain is permanent may run counter to the jury's common sense understanding such that they might simply ignore it and award nothing. 

Should the jury disbelieve the minimal proof, then presumably the jury's verdict will not be upset on appeal.  When it comes to pain and suffering (and mental anguish and inconvenience), the appellate courts have yet to disturb a verdict which awarded nothing for the pain and suffering in the face of awarding medical expenses for the injuries. 

When you trust a jury of your peers to make the decision, it seems the courts are trusting the jury's decision since they are in the best position to evaluate all the evidence (but subject to the judge's ruling on any new trial motions which is then subject to an abuse of discretion standard - again which has not been reversed on appeal yet).

In the Reece v. Nationwide case at trial, the expert testimony of the treating physicians centered on a car accident injury which was sandwiched in between two well-documented accidents with disc injuries and whether or not the plaintiff's attorney had asked the right question and obtained the right answer as to how the injury from THIS accident (as opposed to her cumulative injuries) were permanent and impacted earnings capacity.  One treating physician testified the accident caused a permanent strain/sprain and had referred the plaintiff to a neurosurgeon who opined the accident made the prior disc heriation worse.  The plaintiff did not offer any expert testimony at trial on how the injuries affected her future earnings capacity, but she did testify herself about her career plans were affected by her accident injuries and restrictions.    At trial, the judge granted defense counsel's motion for a directed verdict on permanent injury and permanent impairment on earnings - no instructions and not submitted to the jury.

In addition to the permanency issues at trial, the defense counsel offered testimony that one of the plaintiff's treating physicians had his medical license suspended after the trial deposition had been taken.  SCOKY held it was error to allow in evidence of the medical license suspension of one of appellant's treating physician witnesses.  However, the issue on the medical license was addressed on grounds of relevancy and prejuce; and not under KRE 608 regarding impeachment which the court noted was not raised by counsel at trial and would not be resolved by SCOKY on appeal.

Here is some language from the decison:

We hold that evidence of permanent injury alone is sufficient for an instruction on permanent impairment of earning power, and that the jury can through their common knowledge and experience make the determination if there has been a permanent impairment of earning power, the extent of such impairment, and the amount of damages for such impairment.

* * *

While specific expert witness testimony on permanent impairment of earning power is helpful and often persuasive, see Louisville Metro Hous. Auth . v. Burns, 198 S .W.3d 147, 151 (Ky.App. 2005), it is not necessary to submit the issue of permanent impairment of earning power to the jury. See Pickard Chrysler, Inc. v. Sizemore , 918 S.W.2d 736, 739-40 (Ky.App. 1995) (upholding award of damages for permanent impairment of earning power where there was no expert testimony on how plaintiff's earning power was affected and little evidence of past job history and earnings) . The plaintiff need only show with reasonable probability that the injury sustained is permanent. Rogers v. Sullivan, 410 S.W.2d at 628 . This Court recognizes that a permanent injury may not always result in permanent impairment of earning power. Like the Chesapeake Court, we believe jurors are capable of determining, from the evidence and their common knowledge and experience, whether there has been a permanent impairment, the extent of such impairment, and the value of such impairment.

When reading the cross-examination of the treating physician, it is and was obvious there were issues pertaining to what injuries were caused by the accident versus before and after (since she injured a disc in a cheerleading fall).  With those issues raised in the testimony, defense counsel at the time was placed in the dilemma of how far to pursue the questioning since the burden was perceived to be on the plaintiff to prove permanency and permanent impairment.   What has now been resolved on appeal is that the standard for a permanent impairment instruction is minimal, and defense counsel will vigorously cross-examine on those limitations and might even ask the question of the doctor if he/she believes the patient's ability to work has been affected.  Do not forget that the AMA Guidelines on Permanent Impairment may be relied on heavily in workers compensation proceedings to calculate the economic loss of future wages, they have no such correlation in a personal injury case.   But testimony of no permanent impairment by the guidelines will offer an interesting, if not devastating, counter to any general opinion of a permanent injury or strain - the injury is permanent but they are not impaired by it. 

I suspect cross-examinations in the future on these topics will go further than what we have previously become accustomed to since the concerns over proving the plaintiff's case are removed once the doctor says "permanent injury".

March 14, 2007

Crash Data Recorder - List of vehicles covered

Event data recorders or crash data recorders contain useful information on events leading up to a crash.

The site at Harris Technical Services has a good explanation of the value of a CDR or EDR with a list of those vehicles which them installed.  They also have a few other useful links to speed skid calculator, as well as case law, statutes, and regulations on the CDR.

March 13, 2007

Res Ipsa Loquitor Used When Wheelchair in van flips without explanation

The Court of Appeals in a nonpublished decision applied the doctrine of res ipsa locquitor in a case where injuries occurred when an elderly lady's wheelchair was supposedly strapped down but flipped when driving down the road.  The decision was Mainstream Transportation Co. v. Estate of Martha Rankin, COA, 2/23/2007.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur dates from the late 19th century. See Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863). Literally translated it means “the thing speaks for itself.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1336 (8th ed. 2004). In modern usage it is used when, in some circumstances, the facts alone raise an inference of negligence.

There are three essential elements needed to prove res ipsa loquitur. First, the cause of the injury must be under the control of the defendant. Second, circumstances, according to common knowledge and experience, must create a clear inference that but for the negligence, the injury would not have happened. Third, the injury must have resulted from the situation caused by the negligence. See J.C. Penny Co. v. Livingston, 271 S.W.2d. 906 (Ky. 1954).

The central question in the current matter is the issue of control of the instrumentality that caused the injury. The facts are clear and unclouded. Ms. Rankin was in a wheelchair and was loaded and strapped into Appellant's van by Appellant's employee. Eventually the straps holding her wheelchair came loose, and Ms. Rankin's wheelchair flipped over backwards causing injury to Ms. Rankin.

The jury found Appellant's employee had control of the situation. While there are a myriad of extreme possibilities that may have caused the wheelchair to come loose, those options were for the jury to determine. The jury viewed the evidence of other possible intervening causes and determined that it was reasonable to believe that the acts or failures of Appellant's employee were negligent and caused the incident. It remained possible for a different person, such as Ms. Rankin, to exert control over the wheelchair straps; however, the jury concluded that the ultimate control rested in Appellant's employee. We cannot say this conclusion is unreasonable.

November 22, 2006

Improper Cross-Examination Results in New Trial in Medical Negligence Case Per NPO Decisions at COA

A vigorous cross-examination as to plaintiff's testifying experts medical license results in a reversal in this not for publication decision from the Court of Appeals, dated 10/27/2006.

Defendant doctor's expert testified regarding no deviation from the standard of care.  Plaintiff's doctor was from out of state and not licensed in Kentucky, but he was licensed in Wisconsin and testified so.  However, he made no reference during direct of his license in Minnesota in which he had voluntarily surrendered to it regarding allegations of improper sexual relations with a patient. 

The defense counsel for Dr. Hodes went after plaintiff expert (Dr. Winters) on the licensure issue.   

The Court of Appeals determined this was a collateral matter, and reversed and remanded for allowing such collateral and inflamatory cross examination. 

This case was tried in Jefferson County before Judge Martin McDonald.

IRELAND V. HODES, MD.
TORTS:  MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE (impermissible cross examination of expert)

2005-CA-002095
NOT PUBLISHED
DATE RENDERED: 10/27/2006

In this medical negligence claim, the plaintiff claimed cauda equine syndrome from the negligence of Dr. Hodes who performed two surgeries on her back.

It is undisputed that Ireland suffered cauda equina syndrome as a result of the spinal surgeries performed by Dr. Hodes. Dr. Hodes argues that this syndrome is a known risk of the surgery which Ireland acknowledged prior to surgery.

Plaintiff Ireland's expert Dr. Winter’s license status was not in dispute or issue and did not reflect on his knowledge or ability to testify about Ireland’s condition or Dr. Hodes’ alleged deviation from the standard of care.  The improper cross-examination concerning the stipulation upon and surrendering of Dr. Winter’s medical licenses undoubtedly prejudiced the jury against Dr. Winter.

The prejudicial effect diminished the credibility of Dr. Winter’s testimony concerning Dr. Hodes’ negligence.  The alleged negligence of Dr. Hodes was not within the purview of a lay person; rather, expert testimony was needed to establish the negligence and to aid the jury in determining whether Dr. Hodes was negligent.

By allowing such a collateral and inflammatory cross-examination of Dr. Winter, COA held the trial court committed reversible error.